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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Troy Dewayne Payne appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conviction by a jury of possession of a controlled substance.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Payne showed up at Police Captain Barclay's home and handed him a
package containing methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 109, L. 20 - p. 113, L. 13; p. 168,
L. 20 - p. 169, L. 2; State's Exhibits 100-04.) The state charged Payne with

possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 13-14.) Payne pied not guilty to the
charge and the case was set for a jury trial. (R., pp. 17-18, 32.) On the first day
of trial, the state made an oral motion in limine asserting that if Payne did choose
to testify, testimony about his motives for possessing the methamphetamine
would be irrelevant. (Tr., p. 77, L. 7 - p. 78, L. 11.) The defense response was
that the motion was untimely and that any objection should wait until the
testimony was offered. (Tr., p. 78, L. 16 - p. 79, L. 5;

Tr., p. 80, Ls. 2-6.)

The district court reserved ruling until during the trial. (Tr., p. 80, Ls. 7-23; p. 81,
Ls. 9-14.)
The next morning the parties again touched on the admissibility of
testimony of Payne's motive for possessing methamphetamine in the context of
what could be said in opening statements. (Tr., p. 83, L. 20 - p. 84, L. 4.) The
prosecution argued that the evidence was irrelevant under Idaho Rules of
Evidence 401 and 402 because the only intent associated with the crime was
knowing intent to possess and that possession with intent to turn the
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methamphetamine over to police was not associated with any asserted defense.
(Tr., p. 84, L. 5 - p. 85, L. 4.) Payne's counsel responded that the evidence
would show that Payne "did not intend to possess [the methamphetamine]; that
he intended to get it to law enforcement by the quickest means possible." (Tr., p.
85, Ls. 7-22.)

The district court expressed doubt that desire to get the

methamphetamine "off the street" was a defense, and tentatively ruled that the
defense would have to show that the evidence went to a legal justification for the
possession. (Tr., p. 85, L. 23 - p. 86, L. 19.) The defense then gave an offer of
proof that Payne would testify he was given methamphetamine without his
consent to pay off a debt, he did not want the methamphetamine, and that he
decided to take it straight to the police.

(Tr., p. 86, L. 24 - p. 87, L. 8.) The

evidence would, according to the defense, indicate no intent to possess. (Tr., p.
87, Ls. 9-12.) The district court perceived a difference between someone calling
the police to notify them of methamphetamine and taking possession and
transporting methamphetamine to the police. (Tr., p. 87, L. 24 - p. 88, L. 3.) The
court denied the motion in limine at that time, but without prejudice. (Tr., p. 89, L.
21 - p. 90, L. 4; p. 91, Ls. 7-17.)
After the state presented its evidence, the district court held a jury
instruction conference in which the parties expressed no objection to the jury
instructions.

(Tr., p. 179, L. 24 - p. 180, L. 7.) Based on the instructions the

state renewed its motion in limine.
defense

argued

that

(Tr., p. 180, L. 12 - p. 181, L. 9.)

Payne's testimony

that

he

intended

to turn

The
the

methamphetamine over to police would be relevant to show the same immunity
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conferred on police when they possess controlled substances for law
enforcement purposes.

(Tr., p. 181, L. 10 - p. 182, L. 8.) The district court

rejected this asserted defense as unfounded, implicitly granting the state's
motion to exclude evidence of motive. (Tr., p. 182, L. 9 - p. 184, L. 5.)
At the trial Payne testified that he was driving when someone flashed his
lights at him so he pulled over. (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 4-25.) That person expressed
regret over the loss of Payne's go-cart and threw methamphetamine into Payne's
car. (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 6-9; p. 197, L. 10 - p. 199, L. 20.) Payne testified he then
drove straight to a police officer's house and turned the methamphetamine over
to the officer. (Tr., p. 199, L. 21 - p. 201, L. 9; p. 202, L. 25 - p. 203, L. 8.)
Payne also testified his motivation was to "just get [the methamphetamine) off the
street" (Tr., p. 218, Ls. 10-15) and that he "just wanted it away from" him (Tr., p.
222, Ls. 2-8). In closing argument the defense argued that Payne did not have
intent to possess because his only intent was to turn over to the police the
methamphetamine that had been thrown into his car. (Tr., p. 240, L. 6 - p. 242,
L. 10.)
The jury convicted Payne of possession of methamphetamine. (R., p. 48.)
The district court entered judgment, suspending sentencing and placing Payne
on probation. (R., pp. 59-66.) Payne thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp. 67-70.)
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ISSUE

Payne states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it failed to provide Mr. Payne a fair
opportunity to present his complete defense?
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Payne asserts for the first time on appeal that evidence of motive is
always relevant or, alternatively, that his proposed testimony on his motive was
relevant to a defense of mistake or accident. Has Payne failed to show
fundamental error?
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ARGUMENT
Payne Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Before the trial court Payne argued that his proposed testimony of motive

for possessing methamphetamine was to establish that he had no intent to
possess (Tr., p. 78, L. 16 - p. 79, L. 5; p. 80, Ls. 2-6; p. 85, Ls. 7-22; p. 87, Ls. 912) or that he was entitled to the same immunity as law enforcement (Tr., p. 181,
L. 10 - p. 182, L. 8).

The district court rejected the validity of the asserted

defense and implicitly found the evidence irrelevant. (Tr., p. 182, L. 9 - p. 184, L.
5.)

On appeal Payne contends that he was entitled to explain his motivations
regardless of their relevance. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) He further claims he
had an affirmative defense of misfortune or accident. (Appellant's brief, pp. 910.) He made neither of these arguments below, however. Because he failed to
preserve these arguments, Payne must show fundamental error, a burden he
has not attempted to shoulder, much less actually demonstrate.

B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho

671, 674, 52 P.3d 315, 318 (2002); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d
754, 760 (Ct. App. 2011 ).
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
5

timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

C.

Payne Has Shown No Fundamental Error In The Exclusion Of Evidence
Of His Motive For Possessing Methamphetamine
Whether a claim of error asserted for the first time on appeal is

fundamental, and therefore subject to appellate decision, is reviewed using a
three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Application of these
standards to Payne's appellate arguments shows no fundamental error.
As to the first prong, Payne has failed to demonstrate that "one or more" of
his "unwaived constitutional rights were violated."

Payne argues that he was

denied his constitutional right to present a defense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.)
He first argues that motive is always a defense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) In
the alternative he argues that his defense was misfortune or accident.
(Appellant's

brief,

pp.

9-10.)

Neither of these

unconstitutional denial of a defense in this case.
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arguments

establishes

A defendant has a general right, rooted in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to offer testimony of witnesses, to compel their
attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the facts.

~.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967); State v. Meister, 148 Idaho
236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009).

This constitutional guarantee, however, does not

afford a criminal defendant a right to present irrelevant evidence. Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469,
1473 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718,722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct.
App. 2003); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 956-57, 231 P.3d 1047, 1053-54 (Ct.
App. 2010).

Payne failed to demonstrate that the evidence in question was

relevant either to disprove the state's case or to prove any affirmative defense
actually asserted by Payne at trial.
The testimony of motive was not relevant to rebut the state's case.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115
Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). Possession of a controlled substance
may be either actual or constructive. State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 754, 554
P.2d 684, 686 (1976).

Actual possession requires possession and the

knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho
237, 240-241, 985 P.2d 117, 120-121 (1999). Constructive possession "exists
where a nexus between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so
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as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a
bystander but, rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control
over the substance." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 595, 944 P.2d 727, 730
(Ct. App. 1997).
Evidence that Payne subjectively intended to turn the methamphetamine
over to the police does not have any tendency to disprove his actual or
constructive possession.

Payne admitted knowledge that the package he

possessed contained methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 207, L. 24 - p. 208, L. 8.) He
also admitted knowing possession of the package. (Tr., p. 209, Ls. 3-5.) There
was thus no dispute that, according to the legal definition, Payne was in actual
possession of methamphetamine. Evidence that Payne subjectively wanted to
deliver the methamphetamine to the police did not have a tendency to disprove
his actual or constructive possession. The evidence was not relevant to rebut
the state's evidence of actual and constructive possession, and therefore there
was no constitutional right to present it.
Payne does not argue on appeal that the evidence in question was
relevant to rebut the state's case. Tellingly absent from his brief is any mention
of the relevance standard under Idaho's rules of evidence and any discussion of
the legal standards for proving actual possession. (Appellant's brief, pp. ii, 6-10.)
Instead, Payne argues that there is a free-standing defense of proper motive.
The cases he relies on do not support such a conclusion, however.
In State v. Jones, 25 Idaho 587, 138 P. 1116 (1914) (cited in Appellant's
brief, p. 7), the trial court prohibited the defendant in his embezzlement trial from
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answering a question of whether he intended to defraud because such testimony
was "a self-serving declaration."

&

at 603, 138 P. at 1121. The court held this

was error because a defendant is competent to testify about motive or intention if
those matters are "relevant to the issue."

&

Here the question is not Payne's

competence to testify about his motive, but whether motive was relevant. Unlike
Jones's lack of intent to defraud, Payne's motive for possession was not relevant
to rebut the state's case.
Payne next cites to State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253, 152 P. 1054 (1915)
(cited in Appellant's brief, p. 8), where the defendant was charged with making a
false report of the financial condition of a state bank. The court stated that the
prosecution had the burden of proving both that the defendant made a false
report and that he knew the report was false.

&

at 263-64, 152 P. at 1056. The

court then held that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the defendant
had orally clarified his written report to the bank commissioner because such
would negate intent to deceive.

&

at 265-67, 152 P. at 1057. Again, this case

stands only for the proposition that a defendant may offer relevant testimony
tending to negate his guilt, not that he has an absolute right to explain his actions
even though such explanation is not relevant to the mental state the state must
prove.
In State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55, 357 P.2d 656 (1960) (cited in Appellant's
brief, pp. 8-9), the defendant was charged with grand larceny for steeling sheep.
Citing the general rule that a defendant may testify to motive when such is
relevant the court held that the trial court erred by prohibiting the defendant from
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testifying that he corralled the sheep in question because he believed he had a
right to do so to prevent the sheep, which had come on his property, from
"tromping on my cattle feed."

kl

at 59-60, 357 P.2d at 658-59.

Thus, the

evidence in question was relevant to whether Hopple had felonious intent at the
time of the taking.

kl at 60,

357 P.2d 656.

Payne has thus established by citation to authority that evidence of why
an employee wrote out a check on his employer's account is relevant to whether
the employee had intent to embezzle; evidence of whether a banker orally
clarified a false report was relevant to whether he intended to deceive with the
false report; and evidence of whether a rancher corralling sheep had intent to
deprive the sheep from their owner is relevant to grand larceny. What Payne has
failed to establish is that there is some free-floating constitutional right to testify to
motive or that motive is always relevant, especially under the law applicable in
this case (which goes unmentioned by Payne). In short, Payne has not shown
that the evidence in question was relevant to rebut the state's allegation of
possession of methamphetamine and has therefore failed to show he had a
constitutional right to present it.
In his alternative argument Payne asserts that the evidence was relevant
to the affirmative defense of misfortune or accident. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.)
This affirmative defense applies whenever the crime is committed through
misfortune or accident where there was no "evil design, intention or culpable
negligence." I.C. § 18-201 (3). The state agrees that circumstances such as that
alleged

by Payne, where an

otherwise innocent person accidentally or
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unintentionally acquires possession of a controlled substance he or she does not
want, falls within this defense. This defense was not raised at trial, however. At
trial, the only affirmative defense proffered was a law enforcement exception,
which was rejected by the trial court and is not asserted as a viable defense on
appeal.

At no point did the defense assert the affirmative defense of misfortune

or accident, and in fact acceded to jury instructions not containing this affirmative
defense. (Tr., p. 178, L 21 - p. 180, L. 7.) Because Payne did not raise this
defense at trial, his claim that the trial court denied him this defense is without

merit
Because Payne has failed to establish any constitutional right to present
evidence of his motivation under the facts and law applicable to this case, he has
failed to show the first element of a fundamental error claim.
Payne has also failed to meet the second prong of a fundamental error
claim because he has not shown clear error. Because the evidence does not
appear to be relevant to actual possession there is no clear error in the district
court's holding.

In addition, because Payne did not raise the defense of

misfortune or accident to the trial court it is not clear that the trial court had any
duty to determine the relevance of the evidence to the unasserted defense.
Finally, there was no prejudice. To show prejudice under the fundamental
error standard the "defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the
defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable probability
that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings." Perry, 150
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. If the claim of error were preserved the inquiry
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would be "whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have
convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged
evidence."

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010)

(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

Under either of these

standards the error was harmless.
At the trial Payne was allowed to testify that the methamphetamine came
to him because some person he barely knew threw it into his car and that he
immediately took the methamphetamine to the police. (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 4-25; p.
197, L. 10 - p. 201, L. 9; p. 202, L. 25 - p. 203, L. 8.)

More importantly, he

testified that his motivation was to "just get [the methamphetamine] off the street"
(Tr., p. 218, Ls. 10-15) and that he "just wanted it away from" him (Tr., p. 222, Ls.
2-8), In closing Payne's attorney argued:
So, what do we have here? We have the fact that this was
methamphetamine, the fact that Troy presented it to Captain
Barclay. We have Troy's sworn testimony that he had it for just a
very few minutes before he came over to Captain Barclay's house
and gave it to him.
Now, Mr. Henkes talked about the various jury instructions,
and he referred you to Instruction 11. I'm going to repeat that once
more, just to make sure we got that right. "In every crime or public
offense, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent.
Intent does not mean an intent to commit a crime but merely the
intent to knowingly perform the prohibited act."

Now, in this case, the prohibited act is possession of
methamphetamine.
Did Troy have the intent to possess the
methamphetamine?
Did he have the intent to commit that
particular act? I would submit to you that he didn't.
The guy that threw it through his window threw it through his
window without his permission and then took off immediately. He
didn't get a chance to throw it back.
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If Troy had taken this stuff and put it into a toilet and flushed
it or thrown it into the dumpster, then, you know, he probably would
not be before the court today. But he did what he had been taught
as a kid, and he went to a police officer who he thought he could
trust. And he brought that controlled substance or what he believed
to be a controlled substance to the police officer, and the police
officer then took it.

But I do know that Troy, in the words of the second part of
instruction No. 11, did not have the intent to commit a crime. He
didn't have the intent to knowingly perform the prohibited act. He
wanted to get rid of this stuff just as quickly as he possibly could.
And Captain Barclay's home, he knew where that was. He knew
he was a narcotics detective. And so he went there, and he turned
it in, got it out of his own hands as quickly as he possibly could - in
his testimony, just a few minutes after he obtained that from the guy
in the white SUV.
(Tr., p. 239, L. 25 - p. 242, L. 10 (emphasis added).)
Whether Payne has the appellate burden of showing prejudice or the state
has the burden of showing harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, any error
in the district court's ruling was harmless because Payne in fact testified to his
motivation and such was argued to the jury.
The district court held that evidence of Payne's motivation for his actual
possession of methamphetamine was not relevant to rebut the state's evidence,
a holding Payne does not challenge on appeal.

Payne's claim that a criminal

defendant has a constitutional right to present testimony about motive regardless
of its relevance is without merit. Likewise, although the evidence was relevant to
the affirmative defense of misfortune or accident, such affirmative defense was
not asserted to the trial court and is therefore not a ground for finding error by the
trial court.

Finally, Payne ultimately did testify about his motive and such was
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argued to the jury, so Payne was not prejudiced. For these reasons Payne has
failed to show fundamental error in the district court's evidentiary ruling.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Payne's conviction for
possession of methamphetamine.

DATED this 29th day of March, 2012.
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copy addressed to:
ELIZABETH A ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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